




WHAT IS THE YEAR IN REVIEW?







ICS/OT CYBERSECURITY
YEAR IN REVIEW 2022


Insights from OT threat intel researchers & incident responders





Promote awareness and community engagement









BENTONITE: OPPORTUNISTIC EXPLOITATION


GETTING THROUGH THE OUTER DEFENSES





Implant retrieves malware from adversary Github account

Long-term persistence, reconnaissance, interactive operations





Capable of ransomware attack



CHERNOVITE: NEW IN 2022





Potential to impact all industries and regions



ADVERSARY:

+ Development and effects team focused on ICS disruption

CAPABILITIES:

- + Unique tool development
- + Uses ICS-specific protocols for reconnaissance, manipulation, and disabling of PLCs
- + PLC Credential Capture. Password bruteforcing and denial of service


- Could impact all industries, initially targets electric, ONG
 Companies with Schneider Electric, Omron, and CODESYS
- PLCs, as well as any OPC UA operations

INFRASTRUCTURE:

+ Unknown

ICS IMPACT:

- + Loss of safety, availability, and control; manipulation of <u>control</u>
- + ICS Kill Chain Stage 2 Install/Modify, Execute ICS



Tens of thousands of ICS vendors use CODESYS, Modbus, OPC UA

Capable of Stage 2 of the ICS Cyber Kill Chain



CHERNOVITE'S PIPEDREAM

EVOLUTION OF ICS/OT MALWARE




FIRST scalable, cross-industry OT attack framework (7^{TH} overall ICS/OT specific) Discovered <u>before</u> it was employed for destructive purposes.

5



FINS, MODBUS, CODESYS, OPC UA,
Schneider Electric NetManage

100s



VENDORS IMPACTED

1000s



DEVICES POTENTIALLY
IMPACTED




CHERNOVITE'S PIPEDREAM MALWARE

CAPABLE OF DISRUPTIVE & DESTRUCTIVE ICS/OT IMPACT



1 St scalable, cross-industry OT attack toolkit **7th** ICS/OT targeting malware

Discovered <u>before</u> it was employed for destructive purposes







EVILSCHOLAR & **BADOMEN** are extensible – this is rare.

1000s of CODESYS devices across multiple sectors at risk



MOUSEHOLE

manipulates OPC-UA server nodes & associated devices.

OPC-UA is a widely used communication protocol in ICS/OT





DUSTTUNNEL & LAZYCARGO demonstrate that CHERNOVITE can achieve an end-to-end attack.



THREAT GROUPS INCREASE ACTIVITY IN 2022

RECON, CAPABILITY BUILDING, & INITIAL ACCESS ACTIVITY ACROSS ALL GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL SECTORS



KOSTOVITE

Dragos observed a possible link to multiple adversaries sharing common infrastructure with KOSTOVITE, with reports of exploitation of vulnerabilities by linked APT5.

DRAGOS



KAMACITE

Victims in multiple sectors are observed communicating with KAMACITE Cyclops Blink C2 infrastructure. Cyclops Blink malware is removed from firewall devices.



XENOTIME

Dragos observed reconnaissance and research activity focused on oil and gas entities in the U.S.



ELECTRUM

INDUSTROYER2 malware and a set of wiper malware is discovered at a Ukraine energy provider.



ERYTHRITE

Continued targeting of industrial organizations with SEO poisoning techniques and custom, rapidly deployed malware.



WASSONITE

Dragos observed ongoing deployment of nuclear energy themed spear phishing lures to deliver backdoor malware.

Targeting Energy Many Indus

Targeting Energy Targ

North America, Australia

Ukraine, E

Many Industrial Sectors
Targeted
Ukraine, Europe, U.S.

Targeting Oil & Gas, Electric
Middle East,
North America

Targeting Electric
Ukraine, Europe

Multiple Industrial Sectors
Targeted
U.S, Canada

Multiple Industrial Sectors
Targeted
South/East Asia,
North America

KOSTOVITE




G ENERGY IN NORTH AMERICA, AUSTRALIA SINCE 20 Delivery

Compromise of an energy entity

& power generation facilities



Activity of multiple adversaries sharing common infrastructure with KOSTOVITE



KOSTOVITE-linked APT5 was actively exploiting a zero-day in Citrix perimeter access devices





COMPROMISES INTERNET-EXPOSED REMOTE ACCESS DEVICES

SKILLED LATERAL MOVEMENT & INITIAL ACCESS OPERATIONS INTO ICS/OT

STAGE 2	Develop
STAGE 2	Test
STAGE 2	Deliver
STAGE 2	Install / Modify
STAGE 2	Execute ICS Attack

XENOTIME

TARGETING THE OIL & GAS INDUSTRY IN THE U.S. & EUROPE SINCE 2014



Reconnaissance focused on oil & natural gas (ONG), liquified natural gas (LNG) industries



Heavy use of off-theshelf tools & opensource information




Currently in the development phase, continues to target downstream & midstream ONG/LNG with a focus on pipeline, maritime, refining



ICS Malware: TRISIS


- Delivered in 2017 to an industrial facility in the Middle East by a well funded attack team
- Targeted Safety Instrumented System (SIS) and failed causing a stop in operations
- First malware to specifically target human life

RANSOMWARE ATTACKS INCREASED BY 87%




THE STATE OF ICS/OT VULNERABILITIES

ERRORS COULD CAUSE ASSET OWNERS AND OPERATORS TO WASTE RESOURCES ON LOW-RISK VULNERABILITIES OVER MORE SEVERE ONES.




Dragos analyzed 465 advisories

34% had incorrect data





WHERE VULNERABILITIES EXIST



PRACTICAL RISK MITIGATION IN ICS/OT

PATCHING CAN BE IMPRACTICAL IN ICS/OT DUE TO SAFETY & PRODUCTION REQUIREMENTS, ALTERNATIVE MITIGATION IS KEY



77%

CONTAINS

NO PRACTICAL MITIGATION

FOR ICS/OT

FROM VENDOR OR CNA



CONSEQUENCE-BASED VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT

FOCUS REMEDIATION EFFORTS ON VULNERABILITIES WITH OPERATIONAL IMPACT OR KNOWN TO BE ACTIVELY TARGETED BY ADVERSARIES.

ONLY 2%

OF ICS/OT

VULNERABILITIES NEED

TO BE ADDRESSED

NOW

68% of vulnerabilities

are network exploitable with no direct operational impact

Address these

NEXT

30% of vulnerabilities

pose a possible threat but rarely require action

They likely NEVER need to be addressed

Monitor these for signs of exploitation

Mitigate through network monitoring, segmentation & MFA




JULY 2023: ROCKWELL AUTOMATION VULNERABILITY

Rockwell Automation, in coordination with the U.S. government, released two vulnerabilities on 12 July 2023:

- CVE-2023-3595: RCE with persistence affecting 1756-EN2* and 1756-EN3* models of ControlLogix ENIP comms modules
- CVE-2023-3596: DOS affecting 1756 EN4* models of ControlLogix ENIP comms modules

These vulnerabilities are important because the USG identified a state actor developing exploits against these unknown vulnerabilities for use in attacks; this collective response was PRIOR to the attack leading to a massive success



COLLABORATIVE WORK & COLLECTIVE DEFENSE




BIG CROSS-INDUSTRY LIFT


- US Government
- Rockwell Automation
- Dragos
- Other security vendors


COLLECTIVELY:


- Analyze vulnerabilities
- Test/Develop signatures
- Look for potential activity using respective telemetry

LESSONS LEARNED FROM CUSTOMER ENGAGEMENTS











APPLYING THESE FINDINGS

Key takeaways for your teams:

- Attacks continue to increase for industrial infrastructure
- The tooling used by ICS-focused threat groups is growing more sophisticated
- The number of vulnerabilities found in OT environments continues to grow, while many advisories contain errors and offer limited advice for mitigation
- The industrial community is improving how they handle security perimeters and external connections. However, more work is needed around OT network visibility, segmentation, and controlling connections and credentials over ICS assets

Next steps to protect your organization:

• The SANS Institute identified five critical controls for ICS/OT cybersecurity. Implement these controls in your OT environments to improve your organization's security posture.



RECOMMENDATIONS



01

ICS Incident Response Plan

02

Defensible Architecture

03

ICS Network Monitoring Visibility

04

Secure Remote Access

05

Risk-based Vulnerability Management



THANK YOU



To download a copy of the 2022 Year In Review Report, visit: www.dragos.com/year-in-review/

